The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning by Arieli, Itai et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
03
45
2v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  9
 M
ay
 20
19
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning.
Itai Arieli , Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky
Faculty of Industrial Engineering, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology.
May 10, 2019
Abstract
We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare
in the classic herding model ([6, 8]). When prices are determined exoge-
nously, it is known that learning occurs if and only if signals are unbounded
(see Smith and Sørensen [34]). By contrast, we show that learning can
occur when signals are bounded as long as non-conformism among con-
sumers is scarce. More formally, learning happens if and only if signals
exhibit the vanishing likelihood property introduced bellow. We discuss the
implications of our results for potential market failure in the context of
Schumpeterian growth with uncertainty over the value of innovations.
JEL classification: D43, D83, L13.
1 Introduction
In many markets of substitute products, the value of the various alternatives
may depend on some unknown variable. This may take the form of some
future change in regulation, a technological shock, environmental develop-
ments, or prices in related upstream markets. Although this information is
unknown, individual consumers may receive some private information about
these fundamentals. We ask whether, in such an environment, markets ag-
gregate information correctly and the ex-post superior product eventually
dominates the market.
Research supported by GIF research grant no. I-1419-118.4/2017, ISF grant 2018889, Tech-
nion VPR grants, the joint Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab, the Bernard M. Gordon Center
for Systems Engineering at the Technion, and the TASP Center at the Technion.
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In this work we focus on the role of social learning in such environments.
We study whether the learning process guarantees an efficient outcome.
We isolate the role of learning by introducing a simple duopoly model of
common value in which consumers, with a unit demand, choose between
two substitute products, each with zero marginal cost of production. The
timing of the interaction is as follows. Nature randomly chooses one of
two states of nature, and so determines the identity of the firm with the
superior product. At each stage the two firms observe the entire history of
the market – past prices and consumption decisions – and simultaneously
set prices. Thereafter, a single consumer arrives and receives a private
signal regarding the state of nature. The consumer makes his consumption
decision based on his signal, the pair of prices for each product, and the
entire history of prices and consumption decisions. The consumer can also
choose to opt out of buying any product. Our main goal is to identify
conditions under which asymptotic learning holds; that is, information is
fully aggregated in the market asymptotically.
When prices are set exogenously and fixed throughout, the above model
is exactly the standard herding model [6, 8]. In that model, as shown by
Smith and Sørensen [34], the characterization of asymptotic learning cru-
cially depends upon the quality of agents’ private signals. In particular,
one must distinguish between two families of signals: bounded versus un-
bounded. In the unbounded case the private beliefs of the agents are, with
positive probability, arbitrarily close to zero and one. Therefore, no matter
how many people herd on one of the alternatives, there is always a positive
probability that the next agent will receive a signal that will make him break
away from the herd toward the other alternative. This property, as shown
by Smith and Sørensen [34], entails asymptotic learning. The same logic
applies in our model as well: when signals are unbounded, even if the prior
is extremely in favor of one product, with positive probability there will be
a consumer who gets a sufficiently strong signal,that tilts the consumption
decision toward the a priori inferior product; thus, under strategic pricing
and unbounded signals, asymptotic learning holds.
The learning results in our model depart from those of the canonical
model when signals are bounded. In the herding model there is always a
positive probability that the suboptimal alternative will eventually be cho-
sen by all agents. However, intuition suggests that when prices are endog-
enized they serve to prevent such a herding phenomenon. Hypothetically,
once society stops learning and a herd develops on the product of one firm,
the other firm will lower its product price to attract new consumers and
learning will not cease. It turns out that this intuition, although not en-
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tirely correct, does have some merit. In order for the intuitive argument to
hold, signals must exhibit a property referred to here as vanishing likelihood.
When signals are bounded the posterior belief of any agent, given his
signal, is bounded away from zero and one for any interior prior. The pro-
portion of agents whose posterior lies within ε of the posterior distribution’s
boundaries obviously shrinks to zero as ε goes to zero. We say that signals
exhibit vanishing likelihood if the density of consumers at the posterior be-
lief distribution’s boundaries goes to zero.
Consumers who receive signals that induce such extreme posterior be-
liefs are those consumers who are likely to go against a herd and purchase
the less popular product. We refer to such consumers as nonconformists.
With this interpretation in mind the property of “vanishing likelihood”
serves as a measure of the prevalence of nonconformism. More particularly,
we associate vanishing likelihood with a negligible level of nonconformism
while signals that do not exhibit vanishing likelihood are associated with
significant nonconformism.
When society herds, each agent follows in the footsteps of his predeces-
sors and thus, intuitively, one expects nonconformism (when signals do not
exhibit vanishing likelihood) to induce learning. Our main result shows that
the opposite occurs: in the presence of strategic pricing asymptotic learning
holds if and only if signals have the vanishing likelihood property.
1.1 Schumpeterian Growth
It is widely agreed that innovation and the evolution of technology con-
stantly propel the economy forward. New technologies replace older ones
and may improve product quality, reduce production costs, and often com-
pletely disrupt an industry.
However, not every innovation entails improvement. Arguably, innova-
tions that do not entail improvement will naturally be driven out of the
market and only those that do will prevail. This argument forms the basis
of the evolutionary economics literature that dates back to Marx, Veblen,
and Schumpeter.
In his seminal work, Schumpeter [33] described the process of economic
growth, which he refers to as “Capitalism,” as an evolutionary process that
is shaped by “gales of creative destruction.” Some of his contemporaries
had argued that large and profitable firms are the source of innovation
and so regulation protecting them was essential to R&D investments. By
contrast, Schumpeter argued that incumbent firms, anticipating innovation
by potential entrants, invest in R&D to stay ahead of the game. Therefore
such regulation is unwarranted, and may even be detrimental. However,
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such profitable incumbents may also use their power to drive innovation
away by lowering prices. This is true in particular when it is hard to identify
which innovation constitutes an improvement and which does not.
Does the evolutionary process guarantee that the economy will success-
fully separate the wheat from the chaff? This question becomes more acute
with the accelerated pace of innovation witnessed in the past two decades
[29].
Our theoretical results shed light on this issue and relate the outcome
of the evolutionary process to the market structure. Our model shows that
whenever the proportion of nonconformist consumers (often referred to as
“early adopters” in the context of technological revolutions) is insignificant
(a phenomenon captured by the technical notion of vanishing likelihood),
the evolutionary process successfully sieves the better technologies. How-
ever, whenever this proportion is significant then the evolutionary process
may fail and policies to support entry may be warranted in order to sustain
Schumpeterian growth.
In Section 6 we discuss two case studies from the late 90 related to tech-
nological innovations. In both cases the innovative technology turned out
to be the better than the incumbent one but only in one of these cases
was it adopted by society. Our model provides an explanation as it distin-
guishes between the two cases, based on whether the underlying information
structure complied with the vanishing likelihood condition.
1.2 Related Literature
Our work primarily contributes to the work of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch [8] and Banerjee [6], who introduced models of social learning
with agents who act sequentially. Their primary contribution was to point
out the possibility of information cascades and market failure when signals
are bounded. Smith and Sørensen [34] characterize the information struc-
ture that induces such a potential market failure. In these and many of the
follow-up papers, prices are assumed exogenous and fixed throughout. The
primary departure of our model from this line of research is that our model
incorporates endogenous pricing. We associate a favorite firm (product)
with each state of nature and allow for the firms to set prices dynamically,
based on the information available in the market.
Avery and Zemsky [4] incorporate dynamic pricing into herding models.
They consider a single firm whose product value is associated with an (un-
known) state of nature. Instead of offering the product at a fixed price, as
in the earlier papers, they assume that the price is set dynamically to be
the expected value of the product conditional on all the publicly available
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information. Since their primary interest is to study financial markets, they
assume that there is a market maker that uses all the publicly available
data to set prices. By contrast, we assume that the firms themselves set the
prices.
A model that is reminiscent of our model is that of Bose et al. [9, 10]
who study a monopoly, with a good of uncertain quality, that dynamically
adjusts prices to compete against an outside option. Consumers arrive
sequentially and make a consumption decision based on their predecessors’
decisions, past prices, and an additional private signal. In [9] the authors
restrict attention to signal structures with finitely many signals whereas in
[10] they further restrict attention to symmetric binary signal structures.
In both models it is shown that herding is inevitable and if the public
belief is sufficiently in favor of the monopoly, then the monopoly will price
low enough to attract all consumers, regardless of their realized signal. As
vanishing likelihood never holds when the signal space is finite (see the
discussion in Section 5.1), the results of Bose et al., albeit in a monopoly
framework, hold in our duopolistic model (see the additional discussion in
Section 5.3). Restricting the analysis to finite signal spaces would not allow
the unraveling of the vanishing likelihood property that we introduce and
that characterizes learning when prices are endogenous.
Moscarini and Ottaviani [25] study the duopoly case and their paper
focuses on a single-stage interaction with two firms and a single knowledge-
able consumer. In fact, it is exactly the model of the stage game (Γ(µ))
we study in Section 3.1, except that their model is restricted to a binary
and symmetric signal space. Unsurprisingly, whenever the prior belief is
above (or below) some threshold, all equilibria in their model form a de-
terrence equilibrium (see definition 6), where one firm prices out the other
firm. Clearly, the emergence of a deterrence equilibrium implies that learn-
ing stops in the repeated model. The authors go on to provide comparative
statics over the threshold public belief for which learning stops as a func-
tion of the informativeness of the signal (here is where they leverage the
restricted signal space). As signals become more informative the thresholds
move to the extremes.
Our main result on the one-shot game, Theorem 2, argues that learning
stops whenever the vanishing likelihood condition does not hold. As this
condition can never hold for a finite signal space the result in [25] follows as
a corollary. The main take-home message from comparing our work with
[25] is that learning is determined not by the level of informativeness of
the signals but rather by the vanishing likelihood condition. In particular,
signal distributions that satisfy vanishing likelihood need not be highly in-
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formative. The restriction to a binary model, in this case, is misleading. A
similar distinction is valid in the monopoly setting of Bose et al. [9, 10].
Mueller-Frank [26, 27] introduces a pair of models with dynamic pricing
of a monopoly [27] and a duopoly [26]. The model is very similar to ours
with the distinction that the firms have the informational advantage and
know the true state of the world.1 Mueller-Frank does not characterize the
informational conditions that entail learning, as we do. Rather, he studies
the connection between welfare and learning and shows that learning is not
sufficient for welfare maximization (see Corollary 1). It is worth noting that
in our model, by contrast, learning is necessary and sufficient for welfare
maximization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
main theorem for the case where firms are myopic. Section 3 provides the
proof of the main result. Section 4 is an extension of our model to the case
where firms are farsighted. Section 5 informally discusses some extensions
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Social Learning and Myopic Pricing
Our model comprises a countably infinite number of consumers, indexed by
t ∈ N, and two firms: Firm 0 and Firm 1. There are two states of nature
Ω = {0, 1}. In state ω, firm ω ∈ {0, 1} produces the superior product. We
normalize the value of the superior product to 1 and the value of the inferior
product to 0. In every time period t the two firms first set (non-negative)
prices (τ t0, τ
t
1) ∈ [0, 1]
2 for their products. Then consumer t receives a private
signal and must decide whether to buy product 0, product 1, or neither
product. Formally, the action set of every consumer is A = {0, 1, e}, where
the action a corresponds to the decision to buy from firm i and the action
a = e corresponds to the decision to exit the market and not to buy either
product. The payoff of every consumer t, given the price vector (τ0, τ1) as
a function of the realized state ω, is
u(a, τ0, τ1, ω) =


0 if a = e
1− τa if a = ω
−τa otherwise.
(1)
For simplicity we assume that both firms have no marginal cost of pro-
duction. Hence, firm i’s stage payoff, given a price vector (τ0, τ1), can be
1When firms have an informational advantage the equilibrium analysis, as Mueller-Frank
points out, crucially hinges on consumers’ off-equilibrium beliefs. This is not the case in our
model, which consequently allows for robust observations.
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described as a function of the consumer’s decision as follows:
πi(a, τ0, τ1, ω) =


τi if a = i
0 if otherwise.
(2)
We assume that the state ω is drawn at stage t = 0 according to a
commonly known prior distribution, such that P (ω = 0) = µ0 = 1−P (ω =
1). The state ω is unknown to both the firms and the consumers. Each
consumer t ∈ N forms a belief on the state using two sources of information:
the history of prices and actions, ht ∈ Ht = ([0, 1]
2 × {0, 1, e})t−1 , and a
private signal st ∈ S (where S is some abstract measurable signal space).
2
The firms observe only the realized history ht ∈ Ht at every time t and
receive no private information. Conditional on the state ω, signals are
independently drawn according to a probability measure Fω. We refer to
the tuple (F0, F1, S) as a signal structure. We assume throughout that F0
and F1 are mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other.
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The prior µ0 and the functions F0 and F1 are common knowledge among
consumers and firms.
We let H = ∪t≥1Ht be the set of all finite histories and let H∞ =
([0, 1]2×{0, 1, e})∞ be the set of all infinite histories. We letA ⊂ ∆({0, 1, e})[0,1]
2×S
be the set of decision rules for the consumer; i.e., A is the set of all mea-
surable functions that map pairs consisting of a price vector and a signal to
a consumption decision. A (pure) strategy for consumer t is a measurable
function σt : Ht → A that maps every history ht ∈ Ht and signal st ∈ S
to a decision rule. We denote by σ¯ = (σt)t≥1 a pure strategy profile for
the consumers. We can view σ¯ as a function σ¯ : H → A. A (behavioral)
strategy for firm i is a (measurable) mapping φ¯i : H → ∆([0, 1]). We
note that the strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) together with the prior µ0 and the
signal structure (F0, F1, S) induce a probability distribution P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯) over
Ω×H∞ × S
∞.
Let µt = P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯)(ω = 0|ht) be the probability that the state is 0
conditional on the realized history ht ∈ H. We call µt the public belief at
time t. The following observation regarding the sequence of public beliefs,
{µt}
∞
t=1, is straightforward.
2An alternative model is to assume that consumers do not observe prices. In this alternative
formulation our results go through when restricting attention to pure equilibria. This follows
from the observation that the consumption history determines the corresponding equilibrium
prices at each stage.
3F0 and F1 are mutually absolutely continuous whenever F0(Sˆ) > 0 ⇐⇒ F1(Sˆ) > 0 for any
measurable set Sˆ ⊂ S. Note that with this assumption the probability of a fully revealing signal,
for which the posterior probability is either 0 or 1, is zero.
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Observation 1. {µt}
∞
t=1 is a martingale. Thus, by the martingale conver-
gence theorem, it must converge almost surely to a limit random variable
µ∞ ∈ [0, 1].
A strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) and a history ht induce both an expected
payoff Πti(τ0, τ1, σ¯|ht) for every firm i and an expected consumer utility
ut(τ0, τ1, σ¯|ht).We can now define the notion of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for myopic firms.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) constitutes a myopic Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if for every time t the following conditions hold for almost
every history ht ∈ Ht that is realized in accordance with P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯):
• For every τ ∈ [0, 1],
Πti(φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht) ≥ Π
t
i(τ, φ¯−i, σ¯t|ht).
• For every price vector (τ0, τ1) ∈ [0, 1]
2, and every decision rule σ ∈ A,
Ut(τ0, τ1, σ¯(ht)|ht) ≥ Ut(τ0, τ1, σ|ht).
In words, a strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) constitutes a myopic Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if for every time t and P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯) almost every history
ht ∈ Ht, φ¯i(ht) maximizes the conditional expected stage payoff to every
firm i and σ¯(ht) maximizes the conditional expected payoff to consumer t
with respect to every price vector (τ0, τ1).
Note that our notion of equilibrium is weaker than the notion of a sub-
game perfect equilibrium; however, it still eliminates equilibria with non-
credible threats by consumers. One such equilibrium with non-credible
threats is the following equilibrium: both firms ask for price 0 in every time
period. Every consumer t never buys a product (i.e., plays e) unless both
firms ask for a price of 0, in which case he buys product 0 whenever µt ≥
1
2
and product 1 if µt <
1
2 . Note that this equilibrium is sustained by non-
credible threats made by the consumer. Such threats are eliminated by the
second condition, which requires that conditional on the realized history ht
the decision rule σ¯(ht) be optimal with respect to every price vector (τ0, τ1),
and not just with respect to (τ t0(ht), τ
t
1(ht)). We note that since our results
in the sequel hold for all myopic equilibria they are in particular valid for
subgame perfect equilibria.4
As is common in the literature, we define asymptotic learning as follows.
4A natural question is whether restricting attention to the stronger solution concept yields a
weaker condition for learning. We conjecture that this is not the case, particularly when firms
are myopic.
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Definition 2. Fix a signal structure (F0, F1, S). Let µ0 ∈ (0, 1) be the prior
and let (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) be a strategy profile of the corresponding game. We say
that learning holds for µ0 and (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) if the belief martingale sequence
converges almost surely to a point belief assigning probability 1 to the real-
ized state. Asymptotic learning holds for the signal structure (F0, F1, S) if
learning holds for every prior µ0 and every corresponding myopic Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯). By contrast, asymptotic learning never holds
if for every prior µ0 ∈ (0, 1) and a corresponding myopic Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯), the limit public belief µ∞ lies in (0, 1) with positive
probability.
Thus, when asymptotic learning holds, it must be the case that con-
sumers and firms eventually learn the superior product. In our case, even
for a very strong public belief in favor of one firm, it is not a priori clear that
the strong firm will dominate the market as the weak firm can always lower
its price. However, we show in Lemma 2 that the probability of buying
from the superior firm converges to one when asymptotic learning occurs.
Whenever asymptotic learning doesn’t hold, only one firm prevails (from
some time on, all consumers buy from one firm but are not 100% certain
that it is the superior one). As a result, there is positive probability that
the prevailing firm is the inferior one.
Definition 3. Let fω denote the Radon–Nikodym derivative of Fω with
respect to the probability measure F0+F12 . We consider the random variable
p(s) ≡ f0(s)
f0(s)+f1(s)
, which is the posterior probability that ω = 0, conditional
on the signal s, when the prior over Ω is (0.5, 0.5). Let Gω(x) = Fω({s ∈
S|p(s) < x}), ω = 0, 1, be the two cumulative distribution correspondences
of the random variable p(s) induced by the two probability distributions,
Fω, ω = 0, 1, over S. Define the bounds α¯,
¯
α of the signal distribution as
follows:
¯
α = infx∈[0,1]Gω(x) > 0 and α¯ = supx∈[0,1]Gω(x) < 1.
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The main goal of our paper is to provide a characterization of asymptotic
learning under strategic pricing in terms of the signal structure (F0, F1, S).
Such a characterization is provided by Smith and Sørensen [34] for the
standard herding model where prices are set exogenously. We start by
presenting the formal definition of bounded and unbounded signals due to
Smith and Sørensen [34].
Definition 4. The signal structure (F0, F1, S) is called unbounded if
¯
α = 0
and α¯ = 1. The signal structure (F0, F1, S) is bounded if
¯
α > 0 and α¯ < 1.
5Since F0 and F1 are mutually absolutely continuous it follows that G1 and G0 have the same
support.
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In words, a signal structure is unbounded if for every β ∈ (0, 1) the two
sets {s : p(s) > β} and {s : p(s) < β} have positive probability under
(Fω)ω=0,1. Smith and Sørensen’s characterization shows that in the stan-
dard herding model asymptotic learning holds under an unbounded signal
structure and fails under a bounded signal structure.
2.1 Characterization of Asymptotic Learning
For ease of exposition we make the following assumption on (Gω(x))ω=0,1.
We refer the reader to Section 5 for the general case.
Assumption 1. We assume that the functions {Gω(x)}ω=0,1 are differen-
tiable on (
¯
α, α¯) with continuous derivatives (gω(x))ω=0,1 : [
¯
α, α¯]→ R+.
Definition 5. A signal structure (F0, F1, S) exhibits vanishing likelihood if
g1(
¯
α) = g0(α¯) = 0.
We next show how information aggregation depends on the vanishing
likelihood property. The following theorem provides a full characterization
of asymptotic learning in our model.
Theorem 1. If signals are unbounded or if signals are bounded and exhibit
vanishing likelihood then asymptotic learning holds. If signals are bounded
and do not exhibit vanishing likelihood then asymptotic learning never holds.
Although Theorem 1 formally hinges on Assumption 1, an analog of
this theorem carries over completely to a model without such an assump-
tion. This requires an alternative formulation of the vanishing likelihood
condition. We elaborate on this in Section 5.
Remark 2.1. In fact, the proof of Theorem 1 shows that whenever g1(
¯
α) >
0 the limit public belief µ∞, conditional on state ω = 0, lies in (0, 1) with
probability 1. Analogously, whenever g0(α¯) > 0 the limit public belief µ∞,
conditional on the state ω = 1, lies in (0, 1) with probability 1.
3 Proof of the Main Result
In the proof of Theorem 1 we rely on the analysis of the following three-
player stage game Γ(µ). The game comprises two firms and a single con-
sumer and is derived from our sequential game by restricting the game to a
single period. That is, in Γ(µ) the state is realized according to the prior µ
(state 0 is realized with probability µ and state 1 with probability 1 − µ).
The two firms post a price simultaneously (possibly at random) and a sin-
gle consumer receives a private signal in accordance with (F0, F1, S) and
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based on his private signal and the realized vector of prices takes an action
a ∈ {0, 1, e}. The utility for the consumer is determined by equation (1)
and the utility for the firms is determined by equation (2).
In the following observation, which is a direct implication of Definition
1, we connect the stage game with the sequential model.
Observation 2. A strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) constitutes a myopic Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if and only if for every time t, for P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯), and for almost
every history ht ∈ Ht, the tuple (φ¯0(ht), φ¯1(ht), σ¯(ht)) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) of Γ(µt).
The strong connection of Γ(µ) to our sequential game allows us to de-
rive some insight into information aggregation from the subgame perfect
equilibrium properties of Γ(µ), which we analyze next.
3.1 Analysis of Γ(µ)
We begin by studying the consumer’s best-reply strategy in Γ(µ). We denote
the consumer’s posterior belief after the consumer observes the signal st = s
by pµ(s). It follows readily from Bayes’ rule that
pµ(s) =
µp(s)
µp(s) + (1− µ)(1− p(s))
. (3)
The bounds
¯
α and α¯, together with equation (3), imply that pµ(s) ∈ [
¯
αµ, α¯µ]
with probability one, where:
¯
αµ =
µ
¯
α
µ
¯
α+ (1− µ)(1−
¯
α)
and α¯µ =
µα¯
µα¯+ (1− µ)(1 − α¯)
. (4)
Fix a price vector τ = (τ0, τ1) and note that the consumer optimizes his
expected utility against τ if and only if he follows the following strategy:
σ(µ, s, τ) =


a = 0 if pµ(s)− τ0 ≥ max{(1 − pµ(s))− τ1, 0}
a = 1 if (1− pµ(s))− τ1 ≥ max{pµ(s)− τ0, 0}
a = e otherwise.
(5)
We note that, under Assumption 1, in every perfect Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of the game Γ(µ), the strategy σ constitutes a unique action for the
consumer almost surely.
Note further that every mixed strategy (φ0, φ1) induces two possible
market scenarios: a full market scenario, where, under σ, the consumer
always buys from one of the firms for almost all signal realizations and al-
most every realized price vector τ = (τ0, τ1), and a non-full market scenario,
where σ(µ, s, τ) = e holds with positive probability.
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We can infer from (5) that the consumer buys from Firm 0 whenever
pµ(s)−τ0 ≥ (1−pµ(s))−τ1 and the market is full or whenever pµ(s)−τ0 ≥ 0
and the market is not full.
Given a prior µ and a pair of prices (τ0, τ1), we let vµ(τ0, τ1) be the
threshold in terms of the private belief discussed above that Firm 0 is chosen.
That is, choosing Firm 0 is uniquely optimal for the consumer if and only if
p(s) > vµ(τ0, τ1). One can easily see from the above equations that vµ(τ0, τ1)
has the following form:
vµ(τ0, τ1) =


(1−µ)(1+τ0−τ1)
2µ−(2µ−1)(1+τ0−τ1)
if the market is full,
(1−µ)τ0
µ−(2µ−1)τ0
otherwise.
(6)
Note that vµ(τ0, τ1) is a continuous function of (µ, τ0, τ1).
We can therefore suppress the behavior of the consumer, which, under
Assumption 1, is determined uniquely for every price vector (τ0, τ1) and
almost every signal realization s ∈ S. Hence we can write the expected
utility of Firm 0 in the game Γ(µ) for the price vector τ as follows:
Π0(τ0, τ1, µ) =
(µ (1−G0(vµ(τ0, τ1)) + (1− µ) (1−G1(vµ(τ0, τ1))) τ0 =
[1− (µG0 (vµ(τ0, τ1)) + (1− µ)G1 (vµ(τ0, τ1)))] τ0.
(7)
A similar equation can be derived for Π1(τ, µ), the profit of Firm 1.
For a strategy profile φ = (φ0, φ1, σ), let Prφ,µ be the probability over
Ω× [0, 1]2 × S; the state, the price vector, and the signal set S are induced
by φ, µ and F0, F1.
In what follows we make a distinction between two forms of perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game Γ(µ): a deterrence equilibrium, where
only a single firm sells with positive probability, and a non-deterrence equi-
librium, where both firms sell with positive probability. That is,
Definition 6. A deterrence equilibrium in Γ(µ) is a Bayesian Nash SPE,
(φ0, φ1, σ), in which there exists a unique firm i such that
Prφ,µ(σ(µ, s, τ) = i) 6= 0.
A non-deterrence equilibrium is an equilibrium that is not a deterrence
equilibrium.
The following theorem summarizes the main characteristics of equilibria
in the stage game Γ(µ). This characterization is the driving force behind
the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let µ ∈ (0, 1) and let (φ0, φ1, σ) be a Bayesian Nash subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game Γ(µ):
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1. If signals are unbounded, then no firm is deterred.
2. If signals are bounded and exhibit the vanishing likelihood property,
then no firm is deterred.
3. If signals are bounded and do not exhibit the vanishing likelihood prop-
erty, then:
(a) If g1(
¯
α) > 0, then for some sufficiently high prior, µ¯ ∈ (0, 1),
whenever µ > µ¯ Firm 1 is deterred and Firm 0 captures the whole
market.
(b) If g0(α¯) > 0, then for some sufficiently low prior,
¯
µ ∈ (0, 1),
whenever µ <
¯
µ Firm 0 is deterred and Firm 1 captures the whole
market.
The proof of Theorem 2 as well as the complete analysis of this stage
game is relegated to Appendices A and B.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We next introduce the formal proof of Theorem 1, based on Theorem 2.
Consider the case where signals exhibit vanishing likelihood. In this case,
by Theorem 2, at every time t no firm is deterred in Γ(µt). Therefore the
decision of the consumer remains informative throughout the play. This
implies that asymptotic learning always holds. By contrast, if signals do
not exhibit vanishing likelihood and g1(α¯) > 0, then for µ > µ¯ all equilibria
of Γ(µ) are deterrence equilibria. This implies that when µt crosses µ¯ all
subsequent consumers buy from Firm 0 and learning stops.
In order to establish Theorem 1 we start with the following corollary of
Lemma 5 (the proof can be found at Appendix B).
Corollary 1. If signals exhibit vanishing likelihood or if signals are un-
bounded, then for every ε > 0 there exists some r >
¯
α and δ′ > 0 such that
if µ ∈ [ε, 1 − ε] and φ = (φ0, φ1) is a SPE of Γ(µ), then
Pµ,φ(vµ(τ0, τ1) ≥ r) > δ
′.
A similar condition holds for Firm 1.
In words, by Theorem 2, if signals exhibit vanishing likelihood or if
signals are unbounded, then the probability of a consumer going against
the herd is positive. Corollary 1 argues that this probability cannot be
arbitrarily close to zero if the prior is bounded away from the edges.
Proof of Theorem 1. First we show that if the signal structure (F0, F1, S)
does not exhibit vanishing likelihood, then the martingale of the public
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belief must converge to an interior point. Indeed, let us assume without
loss of generality that g1(
¯
α) > 0. Let (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) be a myopic equilibrium.
By Observation 2, for P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯) almost every history ht ∈ Ht the profile
(σ¯(ht), φ¯0(ht), φ¯1(ht)) is a SPE of Γ(µt). By Theorem 2, there exists µ¯ such
that ∀µ ∈ (µ¯, 1) there is a unique Bayesian Nash subgame perfect equilib-
rium of Γ(µ) in which the consumer almost surely chooses Firm 0 (Firm 1
is deterred by Firm 0). This implies that if µt ∈ (µ¯, 1], then µt+1 = µt with
probability one. We note that since signals are never fully informative it
must be the case that µt < 1 for all t with probability one. Therefore, if the
vanishing likelihood property does not hold, then asymptotic learning fails.
Next we show that if vanishing likelihood holds, then the public belief
martingale converges to a limit belief in which the true state is assigned
probability one. It follows from Observation 2 that (φ¯0(ht), φ¯1(ht), σ¯(ht))
is a SPE of Γ(µt) for P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯) almost every history ht ∈ Ht. Corollary 1
implies that if µt ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ] then for some δ
′ > 0 and r >
¯
α the realized
price vector (τ0, τ1) satisfies vµt(τ0, τ1) ≥ r with probability at least δ
′.
Since the distribution G0(·) first-order stochastically dominates G1(·)
(see Lemma 10 in Appendix D), under any such price vector (τ0, τ1) there
exists a probability at least G0(r) > 0 that the consumer will not buy from
Firm 0. Note that (again by Lemma 10)
G0(vµt(τ0, τ1))
G1(vµt(τ0, τ1))
≤
G0(r)
G1(r)
= β < 1.
Therefore, it follows from Bayes’ rule that with probability at least G0(r)δ
′
the public belief µt+1 satisfies
µt+1
1− µt+1
=
µt
1− µt
G0(vµt(τ0, τ1))
G1(vµt(τ0, τ1))
≤
µt
1− µt
β. (8)
Hence, in particular, if µt ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ], then there exists a positive constant
η > 0 such that, with probability at least G0(r)δ
′, it holds that |µt+1−µt| >
η.
By Observation 1, the limit µ∞ = limt→∞ µt exists and by the above
argument µ∞ ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1. This shows that asymptotic
learning holds.
4 Social Learning and Farsighted Firms
In this section we show that our main result carries forward to a setting
where the firms are farsighted and maximize a discounted expected revenue
stream. We extend our sequential model to the non-myopic case by defining
the non-myopic sequential consumption game. In this model, as in the
14
myopic case, each firm sets a price in every time period, except that now
each firm tries to maximize its discounted sum of the stream of payoffs. We
still retain the perfection assumption with respect to consumers. Given a
strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯), in the repeated game, denote by Π
δ
i (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯)
the expected payoff to Firm i when the discount factor is δ > 0. Namely,
Πδi (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) = E(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯)
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Πti(φ¯0(ht), φ¯1(ht), σ¯(ht)|ht)
)
.
Define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 7. A strategy profile (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) constitutes a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if:
• For every strategy ψ¯i of Firm i,
Πδi (φ¯i, φ¯−i, σ¯) ≥ Π
δ
i (ψ¯i, φ¯−i, σ¯).
• For every time t the following condition holds for almost every history
ht ∈ Ht that is realized in accordance with P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯), every price
vector (τ0, τ1) ∈ [0, 1]
2, and every decision rule σ ∈ A:
ut(τ0, τ1, σ¯(ht)|ht) ≥ ut(τ0, τ1, σ|ht).
Let (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) be a strategy profile, let ht ∈ Ht, and denote by Π
δ
i (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht)
the continuation payoff to Firm i in the subgame starting at history ht ∈ Ht.
Note that Πδi (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht) is well defined for almost every history ht ∈ Ht
that is realized in accordance with P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯). By Definition 7, if (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯)
constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then φ¯i maximizes the continua-
tion payoff Πδi (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht) of Firm i for almost every history ht ∈ Ht that
is realized in accordance with P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯).
We can now state our first result for farsighted firms.
Theorem 3. If the signal structure (F0, F1, S) exhibits the vanishing like-
lihood property or if signals are unbounded, then asymptotic learning holds
for every discount factor δ < 1.6
By Theorem 3, vanishing likelihood is a sufficient condition for asymp-
totic learning.7
For the converse direction we establish the following weaker statement.
6Recall this implies that learning takes place for any prior and any corresponding Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
7The fact that asymptotic learning holds for unbounded signals carries forward to the far-
sighted case under a similar proof to that of the myopic case.
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Theorem 4. If signals are bounded and do not exhibit vanishing likelihood,
then asymptotic learning fails in the following sense: for every prior µ0 ∈
(0, 1) there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for which learning fails.
That is, in order for asymptotic learning always to hold in a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium it is necessary and sufficient for the signal structure to
exhibit vanishing likelihood. We conjecture that, in fact, if vanishing likeli-
hood fails then learning fails in any equilibrium.
5 Discussion
We turn to discuss four natural questions that arise from our model and
analysis:8
• Do our conclusions hold when the differentiability assumption on the
signal distribution (Assumption 1) is relaxed?
• What are the implications of vanishing likelihood in the monopolistic
setting?
• What are the social welfare implications of our results?
• In cases where asymptotic learning holds, how fast do agents learn and
consequently buy the superior product?
5.1 General Signals
Throughout the analysis we have restricted our attention to signal structures
(F0, F1, S) that satisfy Assumption 1. In many applications this assump-
tion fails to hold. In particular, Assumption 1 does not hold when the set
of signals is countable or finite. It is therefore important to understand
whether our condition can be stated more generally to capture all signal
distributions.
Fortunately, it turns out that such a general condition does exist. Let
(F0, F1, S) be a general signal distribution and letGω be the CDFs as defined
in Definition 3. Define g0, g1 ∈ [0,∞] as follows:
g0 = lim inf
x→
¯
α+
G0(x)
x−
¯
α
and g1 = lim inf
x→α¯−
1−G1(x)
α¯− x
.
Obviously, g0, g1 are both well defined. Note that g0 is defined using the
limit from the left (x →
¯
α+) whereas g1 uses the limit from the right
(x→ α¯−).
We can now state the more general condition for vanishing likelihood as
follows.
8We thank anonymous reviewers for prompting these questions.
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Definition 8. The signal structure (F0, F1, S) satisfies vanishing likelihood
if g0 = g1 = 0.
Note that if (F0, F1, S) satisfies Assumption 1, then the condition in
Definition 8 coincides with the condition in Definition 5. Moreover, note
that for finite signal distribution we have g0 = g1 =∞, and thus vanishing
likelihood fails. Our results hold verbatim under the more general definition
of vanishing likelihood for when firms are myopic.
We omit the proofs for the general setting but note that the underly-
ing ideas for the proofs are similar while their exposition becomes more
cumbersome. The primary reason for this is that with an arbitrary signal
structure the consumer can be indifferent between two options (e.g., indif-
ferent between the two products or between a product and exiting) with
positive probability. Therefore, given a price pair, the consumer may have
more than one best reply. In addition, it is not necessarily the case that
any such best reply induces a two-player game between the firms that pos-
sesses an equilibrium. The underlying reason is that the consumer strategy
may lead to discontinuity in firms’ payoffs as a function of prices. Under
Assumption 1 the consumer has a unique best reply with probability one
and such discontinuity can be ignored.9
An additional challenge that results from the aforementioned disconti-
nuity pertains to the mere existence of an equilibrium in Γ(µ). Absent this
equilibrium, our results become vacuous. Fortunately, we can use the result
of Reny [30] to overcome this.
Consider the following specific best-reply consumer strategy: whenever
a consumer is indifferent between buying from one firm and the outside
option he always chooses to buy from the firm. Whenever a consumer is
indifferent between buying from Firm 0 and Firm 1, and his expected utility
from purchasing a product is at least zero, he chooses the firm that is a priori
favorable. That is, in this case he chooses Firm 0 whenever µ ≥ 12 and Firm
1 whenever µ < 12 . In all other cases he strictly prefers one alternative and
therefore chooses this alternative.
With this consumer strategy, game Γ(µ) satisfies Reny’s better-reply se-
cure condition [30] for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. Theorem 3.1 in [30] thus guarantees
the existence of a mixed subgame perfect equilibrium in Γ(µ).
9The omitted proofs are available from the authors upon request. Although we have not
written a rigorous proof for the case where firms are farsighted, we believe that the results carry
through.
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5.2 Monopolistic Market
A natural question to ask is what are the necessary and sufficient conditions
for asymptotic learning when there is a single firm that competes against
an outside option. It turns out that the vanishing likelihood condition plays
a crucial role in the monopolistic case as well.
More precisely, consider a monopolistic model with a single firm and a
binary state space. In state ω = 0 the firm offers a high-quality product
(the common value is one) whereas in the other state (ω = 1) the common
value is zero. At each stage the firm sets a price and a new consumer
arrives. The consumer receives a private signal and chooses whether or not
to buy the good (the outside option is valued at zero). The methodology
and techniques discussed in this paper may be used to show that in the
monopolistic setting, vanishing likelihood guarantees asymptotic learning
and the lack of vanishing likelihood (at both ends) implies that asymptotic
learning fails.10
5.3 Social Welfare
The main goal of this paper is to identify the informational structure that
guarantees learning. As we now turn to show, in our model, learning guar-
antees that eventually all agents purchase the superior product. This im-
plies that vanishing likelihood is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
market to be (asymptotically) efficient.11
Corollary 2. Let (σ, τ0, τ 1) be a myopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If
asymptotic learning holds, then conditional on state ω ∈ Ω,
lim
t→∞
P(σ,τ0,τ1)({σt(µt, s, τ(µt)) = ω}|ω) = 1.
The corollary follows from the proof of our main theorem and its proof
is relegated to Appendix D.
5.4 Rate of Convergence
A natural question to ask is, in cases where asymptotic learning holds, how
fast does the market reach a situation where the consumer buys the superior
10Formally, the notion of vanishing likelihood is related to two conditions on the signal struc-
ture, that correspond to the two extreme values: the highest and lowest possible signals. Indeed,
if one of these conditions fails then learning fails in the duopolistic setting. By contrast, in the
monopolistic setting failure of learning is guaranteed only when both conditions are not satisfied.
11In some variants of the herding model, such as those studied in by Mueller-Frank [26, 27],
learning does not entail market efficiency.
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product with high probability. In the herding model, this question has only
recently received attention (see, e.g., Rosenberg and Vieille [31] and Hann-
Caruthers et al. [20]). In particular, Rosenberg and Vieille [31] demonstrate
a sharp negative result showing that for “reasonable” unbounded signals,
the expectation of the first correct decision by a consumer, is infinite. In our
setting we conjecture that under vanishing likelihood breaking bad herds is
faster and thus the rate of convergence is higher. We leave this interesting
question for future research.
6 Case Studies
An intriguing application of our theoretical results relates the outcome of
the evolutionary process of Schumpeterian growth. One particular interest
(and concern) is a corollary of our main theorem. Our main theorem as-
serts that whenever one firm is sufficiently a-priori advantageous (i.e. the
public belief from the outset is that it has the superior product with high
probability), it can use predatory pricing to obstruct the entry of entrants
yielding innovative substitute products and technologies. In fact, when-
ever the demand side does not exhibit the vanishing likelihood property,
predatory pricing will eventually become the incumbent’s optimal strategy.
Recent technological advances had led to an increase in the number and
complexity of proposed innovations [29]. The rise of the Internet increased
the exposure to new products and the pace at which adoption decisions are
made. Social networks inform potential consumers over the action taken
by their predecessors, therefore we suspect that such an advantage is quite
typical.
We illustrate the outcome of our model using two case studies. In one
case, which fits the vanishing likelihood requirements, the incumbent in-
deed priced out a substitute product, considered by many in hindsight as
the superior product. In the other, which fits the opposite scenario, the in-
cumbent did not engage in predatory pricing and indeed the new product,
which is obviously the superior one, prevailed.
Given our informal discussion and the underlying assumptions we put
forward for these two cases, in particular with respect to the prevalence
of (or lack thereof) vanishing likelihood, we recommend to read them with
a grain of salt. In addition, even if one agrees with our assumptions one
can suggest alternative explanations to account for the different incumbent
reaction in both cases (some of which we mention in footnotes).
A tale of vanishing likelihood: In the mid-1990s, with around 10 per-
cent market share, Barnes and Noble (BN) was a clear leader in the US
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book-selling market [16, 18]. BN rose to power by perfecting the shopping
experience for buyers and through aggressive discounts, of 20 − 30 percent
of cover prices [19].
In 1995 BN faced a new type of competition: Amazon’s online retail. In
hindsight this is a classic example of “creative destruction”; however, back
then the success of online retail was ambiguous. In the late 90s the Internet
was new and was definitely not conceived as a retail shopping channel [13].
Uncertainty about the security of online payments was immense [35, 14]
and many considered instant gratification, absent from online shopping, as
central to the shopping experience.
To overcome these challenges, Amazon offered 40 percent discounts
of cover prices, while BN maintained its 20–30 percent discount. Early
adopters of the new technology started shopping online, followed by more
conservative shoppers. Fourteen years later Amazon was a clear market
leader while BN closed most of its shops. With a 16.5% market share and
over $400B in trade in the 2016 US market [28], online retail shopping is a
proven superior innovation.
We note that BN, with its 28 percent operational profitability at the time
[11], could have lowered prices and driven Amazon out of the market. Was
it rational to maintain its high profit or should BN have offered additional
discounts given the information available at the time? We shall revisit this
issue after the next case study.
A tale of non-vanishing likelihood: In the game console market, the
quality of a product is determined by a variety of measurable determinants
(e.g., graphic capabilities, CPU speed, RAM) and unmeasurable ones (e.g.,
design, gameplay, and game titles). Back in the late 1990s, game consoles
offered no connected gaming and so network effects and externalities were
less significant in console adoption.12
The Dreamcast game console, developed at the end of the 1990s, was
Sega’s second attempt to restore its place as an industry leader.13 The
market leader at the time was Sony with its PlayStation I console. In
12One may still claim that network effect played an important role in “Dreamcast” failure.
One of the authors, a enthusiastic ‘gamer’ at the time Sega launched the Dreamcast, contend
this network effect for the following reasons: (1) “Sega” was a veteran game manufacturer, which
held the intellectual property rights for various strong titles such as: “Golden axe”, “Zelda”,
“Sonic” etc. These titles where not available to “Sony”. ;and (2) Sony’s next console, the
“Playstation II”, did not reach the market until the following year and was known to offer no
backward compatibility. Therefore it is unclear which of the firms enjoyed a stronger the network
effect.
13Sega’s previous console, the “Saturn,” had failed miserably due to its “awful gameplay and
inferior design” [37].
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contrast with BN’s strategy of ignoring Amazon, Sony preempted the launch
of Dreamcast by offering a 30 percent discount on its own console a month
before the release of Dreamcast and one year before releasing its own next-
gen product [36, 38]. As a result, Dreamcast did not manage to penetrate
the market and Sega stopped making and selling this console less than two
years after its introduction.14
In retrospect, Dreamcast was acknowledged as the superior technology
and some even consider it one of the best consoles ever developed. This rea-
sonably priced and developer-friendly technology contained many futuristic
features such as “network gameplay” and 64-bit high resolution graphics.15
Some of these novel features did not reach the market until more than half
a decade later.16 In Schumpeter’s framework, growth had been delayed.
Vanishing vs. non-vanishing likelihood: Why did the incumbent firm
price aggressively, thus interfering with the evolutionary process, in one case
and not in the other? What is the primary distinction that explains this?
One explanation that resonates with our model has to do with the different
nature of the demand side of both markets. Buyers of game consoles are
highly engaged and actively seek information regarding new releases and
so we witness more diverse opinions by buyers and a substantial propor-
tion of nonconformism. By contrast, book buyers, who do show interest
and are engaged when it comes to the decision of which title to buy, are
less inquisitive when it comes to the actual shopping experience. Only a
marginal proportion would not conform to traditional shopping practices.
Thus the marginal proportion of nonconformists, captured by our notion of
vanishing likelihood, is significant in the console market and is insignificant
in the book market.17 For Sony it was rational to reduce prices in order
to maintain the nonconformist market share. For BN, on the other hand,
the size of the nonconformist market share coupled with the ambiguity of
14Indeed, Tadashi Takezaki, a former executive at Sega, points out two main factors related
to the failure of Dreamcast: (1) Consumer skepticism about Sega’s abilities to produce a viable
product following the aforementioned “Saturn” fiasco and (2) Sony’s aggressive pricing [17].
15Even today, over a decade and a half after its initial release, second-hand consoles are being
traded on eBay and new Dreamcast titles are being released [12], which serves as a testimony to
the console’s technical superiority.
16Online multiplayer interface was introduced by PlayStation III in 2006, the same year a
control system with motion detection first appeared in the Nintendo Wii.
17An alternative explanation may be that demand for most products is likely to be multi-
dimensional. We argue that in these two cases studies, pricing plays a major part in the con-
sumer’s decision. In the Amazon case, consumer price sensitivity played a major part in the
raise of the book-superstores. It is therefore only logical to assume that it was also meaningful
in their demise. In the gaming console example, the majority of potential consumers at the time
were not the gamers themselves, but their parents, which were more price sensitive (see [17]).
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the success of the new online shopping paradigm was insufficient to forego
profits.18
7 Summary
In the classic models of social learning, the consumers’ utility from each
alternative is fixed. Thus, when signals are bounded, there is always a pos-
itive probability that the inferior product will prevail [6, 8]. However, when
signals are unbounded there are always nonconformist consumers who go
against the herd and purchase the product most others won’t (see Smith
and Sørensen [34]). These nonconformists are instrumental for the afore-
mentioned information aggregation when the consumers’ choice is between
products with fixed prices. However, our setting involves strategic pricing
that alters these results. As each of the firms can now lower its price and
attract consumers, even when the prior belief is biased against it, or price
out its competitor if the prior belief is in its favor. We ask two questions:
When are these pricing strategies optimal? And what implications do these
strategies have for the manner in which markets aggregate information?
We find that the proportion of nonconformist consumers plays a significant
role in answering these questions. An intuitive extension of the model with
fixed prices suggests that more nonconformists implies more social learning.
However, our main finding is the exact opposite: social learning occurs only
when the number of nonconformist consumers is small. This is the condition
we refer to as “vanishing likelihood.”
We study the conditions under which markets in which firms are en-
gaged in a pricing competition enable or hinder social learning. We do so
by introducing a simple setting of duopolistic pricing competition. We first
study a simplified model where firms are myopic and prove that in this
setting, when signals are bounded, social learning occurs if and only if the
signal distributions exhibit the vanishing likelihood property. We then ex-
tend these results to a version of the model with forward-looking firms that
maximize their expected discounted future revenue stream.
The rationale behind this counterintuitive result is uncovered when an-
alyzing the firms’ incentives in the stage game. As society learns, one of the
firms, say Firm 0, emerges as the better one. At that stage the new con-
sumer, prior to receiving a signal, assigns a high probability to Firm 0 having
18One could suggest that the nonconformism of the game console market is captured by the
notion of unbounded signals whereas the book market exhibits bounded signals. Adopting this
approach must lead to the conclusion that creative destruction would be observed in the console
market and not in the book market, contrary to the evidence.
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the superior product. In other words, the stage game begins with a biased
prior toward Firm 0, which now wants to exploit this near-monopolistic
status and set a high price. The only reason not to do so is when the next
consumer is very likely to receive a strong signal that Firm 1 is superior and
consequently does not conform with his predecessors. This argument can be
ignored by Firm 0 when the probability of this event is low enough, which is
exactly captured by our notion of “vanishing likelihood.” Therefore, when
signals exhibit vanishing likelihood, the popular firm ignores nonconformist
consumers and foregoes this market share by setting prices high. Firm 1
sets prices low and wins over the consumer in the rare event that he is a
nonconformist, thus breaking the herd phenomenon. Notice that no matter
how small the probability of this is in the stage game, when we go back to
the repeated game it eventually happens with probability one.
While our major contribution is to the literature on social learning, the
vanishing likelihood property and its effect on firms’ strategic behavior has
interesting implications for market behavior. In particular for market entry
and the adoption of new technologies. Previous work which studied such
questions assumed that incumbents have, either an informational advantage
(see [5]) or the “first move” advantage and can preempt entry by increasing
capacity or investing in R&D ([1, 7]) or both (see [23, 24]). To the best
of our knowledge, our stage game is the first example of predatory pricing
behavior, when both incumbent and entrant act simultaneously, and no firm
has an informational advantage. We study these aspects in a companion
paper (Arieli et al. [3]).
In addition to the theoretical contribution of the paper, we believe that
the intuition uncovered in our model merits further discussion and may pave
the way to subsequent work in related fields. For example, a stylized version
of the model may be used to examine questions of firm pricing dynamics, or
the interim social cost associated with predatory pricing in experience good
markets. Note that the market failure we uncover, can be easily rectified
by employing a minimum price policy (Similarly to the policy employed
to enable entry to the Israeli communications market [32]). The costs and
benefits of such policy are left for follow-up work.
Another potential direction may be an empirical examination of technol-
ogy adoption success and failures. While it may be difficult to directly as-
certain whether a distribution satisfies the “vanishing likelihood property”,
it is possible to examine whether a large proportion of non-conformists aids
or obstructs the process of innovation adoptions (similarly to [22]).
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A Proofs of the Stage Game
A.1 Equilibrium Analysis of Γ(µ)
We start with some preliminary results concerning equilibrium behavior in
the game Γ(µ). Throughout we use the notation φi ∈ ∆([0, 1]) for a mixed
strategy of Firm i and τi for a pure strategy.
For µ ∈ [0, 1] we use the following shorthand: Gµ(x) = µG0(x) + (1 −
µ)G1(x). It follows by equation (7) that whenever the consumer’s strategy
σ obeys equation (5), the expected utility of Firm 0 in the game Γ(µ),
Π0(τ0, τ1, σ), can be written as follows:
Π0(τ0, τ1, σ) = (1−Gµ(vµ(τ0, τ1)))τ0. (9)
For a mixed strategy profile (φ0, φ1), let φ ∈ ∆([0, 1]× [0, 1]) be the price
probability distribution (φ0, φ1) induced over [0, 1]× [0, 1]. By equation (9),
Firm 0’s payoff from the mixed strategy profile (φ0, φ1) can be written as
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follows:
Π0(φ0, φ1, σ) = Π0(φ0, φ1) =∫ (
µ(1−G0(vµ(τ0, τ1) + (1− µ)(1−G1(vµ(τ0, τ1))
)
τ0dφ(τ0, τ1),
(10)
where vµ(·, ·) is defined as equation (6).
The next lemma provides an alternative way to write vµ(τ0, τ1) and its
derivative. This will turn out to be useful in the sequel. Consider the
following function v¯µ : [0, 1]
2 → R :
v¯µ(τ0, τ1) ≡


log(
1+τ0−τ1
2
1−
1+τ0−τ1
2
)− log( µ1−µ)] if the market is full,
log( τ01−τ0 )− log(
µ
1−µ) if the market is not full.
(11)
Lemma 1. It holds that
∂v¯µ(τ)
∂τ0
|τ∗(µ) =


2
1−(τ0−τ1)2
if the market is full,
1
τ0(1−τ0)
if the market is not full
(12)
and
∂vµ(τ)
∂τ0
=
ev¯µ(τ0,τ1)
(1 + ev¯µ(τ))2
∂v¯µ(τ0, τ1)
∂τ0
. (13)
Proof. The proof makes standard use of the log-likelihood ratio transfor-
mation (see, e.g., Smith and Sørensen [34], Herrera and Hørner [21], and
Duffie et al. [15]). The log-likelihood ratio of a belief p ∈ [0, 1] is given by
log( p1−p). In particular, the log likelihood ratio of the posterior belief is
log(
pµ(s)
1− pµ(s)
) = log(
µ
1− µ
) + log(
p(s)
1− p(s)
). (14)
It follows from equation (6) that a consumer with private belief pµ(s) prefers
Firm 0 if and only if
log(
pµ(s)
1− pµ(s)
) ≥ log(
vµ(τ)
1− vµ(τ0, τ1)
) = v¯µ(τ0, τ1).
Equation (13) then follows directly from the fact that vµ(τ) =
ev¯µ(τ)
1+ev¯µ(τ)
.
A simple lemma that turns out be useful in our analysis is the following:
Observation 3. Let µ ∈ [0, 1] and let (φ0, φ1) be a SPE of Γ(µ). The
following properties hold:
φ0([2
¯
αµ − 1, 1]) = 1 and φ1([1− 2α¯µ, 1]) = 1.
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Proof. We prove the observation for Firm 0. Note that if
¯
αµ ≤
1
2 we have
nothing to prove. Assume that
¯
αµ >
1
2 ; in this case we have that if τ0 =
2
¯
αµ − 1, then the consumer will buy from Firm 0 with probability one for
almost every signal realization s and every price τ1 ≥ 0 of Firm 1. To see
this, note that pµ(s) >
¯
αµ for almost every signal s ∈ S. Therefore,
pµ(s)− (2
¯
αµ − 1) > 1− pµ(s).
This shows that for a price τ0 = 2
¯
αµ−1 the consumer buys from Firm 0 with
probability one even for τ1 = 0. In particular, under any price τ0 ≤ 2
¯
αµ− 1
the expected profit of Firm 0 is τ0. Therefore, if
¯
αµ >
1
2 the price 2¯
αµ − 1
strictly dominates all prices τ0 < 2
¯
αµ − 1 for Firm 0.
A.2 Properties of Deterrence Equilibria
A key property of a deterrence equilibrium is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (φ0, φ1) be a deterrence equilibrium in the game Γ(µ). If
Firm 0 controls the market, then
¯
αµ ≥
1
2 . Symmetrically, if Firm 1 controls
the market then α¯µ ≤
1
2 .
In words, if Firm i is driven out of the market (in the sense that the
consumer surely does not buy from it) it must be the case that the con-
sumer’s posterior belief assigns a probability of at most 12 that Firm i is the
superior firm.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that
¯
αµ <
1
2 and that (φ0, φ1) is a deter-
rence equilibrium in which Firm 1 is deterred. In this case Π1(φ0, φ1) = 0.
Consider a deviation of Firm 1 to the pure strategy τ1 =
1−2
¯
αµ
2 > 0. By
equation (5) we can conclude that any consumer whose signal falls in the
set {s ∈ S|pµ(s) ∈ [
¯
αµ,
¯
αµ + ¯
αµ
2 +
1
4)} will choose Firm 1 with probability
one for any equilibrium strategy φ0 for Firm 0.
Note that the set {s ∈ S|pµ(s) ∈ [
¯
αµ,
¯
αµ + ε)} has positive probability
for every ε > 0 and in particular for ε =
¯
αµ + ¯
αµ
2 +
1
4 . Therefore this
deviation entails a positive expected utility for Firm 1 and hence a profitable
deviation, thus contradicting the equilibrium assumption.
Given a deterrence equilibrium, there is always a unique price for the firm
that controls the market. The price of the firm that controls the market
is determined such that its least favorable consumer becomes indifferent
between buying from the dominant firm or receiving the other firm’s product
for free. Thus, under deterrence equilibrium the consumer buys from the
dominant firm with probability one.
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Proposition 1. If (φ0, φ1) is a deterrence equilibrium in game Γ(µ), then
φ0 = 2
¯
αµ − 1 and Π0(φ0, φ1) = 2
¯
αµ − 1 if
¯
αµ ≥
1
2
φ1 = 1− 2α¯µ and Π0(φ0, φ1) = 1− 2α¯µ if α¯µ ≤
1
2
.
Proof. Let us assume without loss of generality that Firm 1 is deterred and
so
¯
αµ ≥
1
2 (By Lemma 2). It follows from Observation 3 that φ0([2¯
αµ −
1, 1]) = 1. Assume by way of contradiction that φ0[2
¯
αµ − 1 + δ, 1] > 0 for
some positive δ > 0 and consider the price τ˜1 =
δ
2 for Firm 1 (the deterred
firm). In this case, for any realized τ0 ∈ [2
¯
αµ − 1+ δ, 1], any consumer with
a private signal s such that pµ(s) ∈ [
¯
αµ,
¯
αµ+
δ
4 ], an event whose probability
is positive, will buy from Firm 1, which, in turn, will have a positive utility.
In the deterrence equilibrium Firm 1’s utility is obviously zero and hence
the price τ˜1 =
δ
2 constitutes a profitable deviation, thus contradicting the
equilibrium assumption. Therefore φ0[2
¯
αµ − 1 + δ, 1] = 0 for any δ > 0.
Hence Firm 0 plays τ0 = 2
¯
αµ − 1 with probability one, as claimed.
By Lemma 2, the condition
¯
αµ ≥
1
2 is necessary in order for a deterrence
equilibrium (in which Firm 1 is deterred) to exist. We now turn to study
the implications of this condition.
Lemma 3. If (φ0, φ1) is a non-deterrence Bayesian Nash SPE of Γ(µ),
then the following conditions hold: φ0((2
¯
αµ − 1, 1)) > 0, Π0(φ0, φ1, σ) ≥
2
¯
αµ−1, and Π1(φ0, φ1) > 0. Symmetrically for Firm 1, φ1((1−2α¯µ, 1)) > 0,
Π1(φ0, φ1, σ) ≥ 1− 2α¯µ, and Π0(φ0, φ1) > 0.
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma. Lemma 3 implies that φ0([2
¯
αµ−
1, 1]) = 1. We further note that if (φ0, φ1) is a SPE profile for which φ0 is
the Dirac measure on 2
¯
αµ − 1, then Π0(φ0, φ1) = 2
¯
αµ − 1, which means
that the consumer buys from Firm 0 with probability 1. Hence such an
equilibrium must be a deterrence equilibrium. Therefore, it must hold that
φ0((2
¯
αµ − 1, 1)) > 0.
The fact that Π1(φ0, φ1) > 0 follows since, as in the proof of Proposition
1, if φ0((2
¯
αµ−1, 1)) > 0, then Firm 1 can guarantee a positive payoff against
φ0.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Unbounded signals
We begin the proof of Theorem 2, by studying the case of unbounded signals,
i.e., where
¯
α = 0 and α¯ = 1. The following corollary shows that whenever
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signals are unbounded there can not be a deterrence equilibrium. In fact
all equilibria are non-deterrence equilibria.
Corollary 3. If signals are unbounded then there are no deterrence equi-
libria in Γ(µ).
Proof. Since α¯ = 0 and
¯
α = 1 it follows that
¯
αµ = 0 and α¯µ = 1. The proof
now follows from Lemma 2.
Bounded signals with vanishing likelihood
We now consider the case where signals are bounded, i.e.,
¯
α, α¯ ∈ (0, 1), and
signals exhibit the vanishing likelihood property, i.e., g1(
¯
α) = 0. In the
following lemma we show that the vanishing likelihood property also yields
that g0(
¯
α) = 0.
Lemma 4. If the signal structure (F0, F1, S) exhibits vanishing likelihood
then g0(
¯
α) = 0.
Proof. Since vanishing likelihood holds we have that g1(
¯
α) = 0. Assume
to the contrary that g1(
¯
α) < g0(
¯
α). Since F0, F1 are absolutely mutually
continuous, there exists ε such that
∫
¯
α+ε
¯
α
g0(s)ds >
∫
¯
α+ε
¯
α
g1(s)ds⇒ G0(
¯
α+
ε) > G1(
¯
α+ ε). This stands in contradiction to Lemma 10 in Appendix D,
which shows that G0 first order stochastically dominates G1.
The second part of Theorem 2 is proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the signal structure (F0, F1, S) exhibits vanishing likeli-
hood, then for every µ ∈ (0, 1) there is no deterrence equilibrium in Γ(µ).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that µ ∈ (12 , 1) and assume to the
contrary that there exists a deterrence equilibrium in Γ(µ). By Lemma 2,
the only possible deterrence equilibrium is one in which Firm 1 is deterred
and by Proposition 1 it must take the form of (2
¯
αµ − 1, φ1). Therefore,
Π0(2
¯
αµ − 1, φ1) = 2
¯
αµ − 1. We first claim that it is sufficient to show that
Π0(2
¯
αµ − 1 + ε, 0)−Π0(2
¯
αµ − 1, 0) > 0 (15)
for some ε > 0. To see this, note that Π0(2
¯
αµ − 1, φ1) = 2
¯
αµ − 1 for any
mixed strategy φ1 of Firm 1. In addition, for any fixed price τ0 of Firm 0
the payoff Π0(τ0, τ1) is (weakly) decreasing in τ1. Therefore, the inequality
in (15) implies that Π0(2
¯
αµ − 1 + ε, φ1) > 2
¯
αµ − 1 for any mixed strategy
φ1 of Firm 1. Therefore, if 2
¯
αµ− 1+ ε yields a profitable deviation to Firm
0 against price τ1 = 0 it also yields a profitable deviation with respect to
any strategy φ1 of Firm 1.
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To establish equation (15) note that
∂Π0(τ0, 0)
∂τ0
|τ0=2
¯
αµ−1 =
1− (2
¯
αµ − 1)
(
∂vµ(τ0, 0)
∂τ0
|2
¯
αµ−1
)
(µg0(
¯
α) + (1− µ)g1(
¯
α)) .
(16)
Since vanishing likelihood holds, by Lemma 4 we have that g1(
¯
α) =
g0(
¯
α) = 0. Therefore equation (16) implies that
∂Π0(τ0, 0)
∂τ0
|τ0=2
¯
αµ−1 = 1.
Hence Π0(2
¯
αµ−1+ε, 0)−Π0(2
¯
αµ−1, 0) > 0 for all sufficiently small ε > 0.
If a deterrence equilibrium does not exist then at each stage of our se-
quential setting the actual action of the consumer will give us additional in-
formation and the public belief will shift. Intuitively, this drives the learning
result. However, it turns out that this is not enough. Herrera and Hørner
[21] show that in the herding model the fact that µt 6= µt+1 with probability
one does not imply that asymptotic learning holds. In order to establish
asymptotic learning the following stronger result is required.
Lemma 5. If the signal structure (F0, F1, S) exhibits the vanishing likeli-
hood condition or signals are unbounded, then for every ε > 0 there exists
δ > 0 such that if µ ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ] and φ = (φ0, φ1, σ) is a SPE of Γ(µ), then
Pµ,φ(σ(τ0, τ1, s) = a) ≤ 1− δ for any Firm i = 0, 1.
Note that Lemma 5 subsumes Proposition 2 in that under vanishing
likelihood, a deterrence equilibrium does not exist. This applies that there
exists an upper bound on the probability that the consumer buys from any
given firm. This in turn implies that if µ is bounded away from zero and
one, then the distance between µ and the posterior probability, conditional
on the action of the current consumer, is bounded away from zero.
Proof. We prove the lemma under the assumption that the signal structure
(F0, F1, S) exhibits vanishing likelihood. The proof for the unbounded case
is similar and therefore omitted.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists an ǫ > 0 and a sequence
of SPE φk = (φk0 , φ
k
1 , σk) of Γ(µk) such that µk ≤ 1− ǫ and
lim
k→∞
Pµk ,φk(σk(τ0, τ1, s) = 0) = 1.
In words, as k increases, the prior approaches 1. We show that this entails
that the probability of the consumer buying from Firm 0 approaches 1 as
well.
31
We can clearly assume (possibly by considering subsequences) that the
sequence {Πω(φ
k
0 , φ
k
1 , σk)}
∞
k=1 converges. Similarly, we can assume that
{(φk0 , φ
k
1 , µk)}
∞
k=1 converges to some (φ0, φ1, µ).
19 As limk→∞Pµk ,φk(σk(a =
0)) = 1, the limit profit of Firm 1 shrinks to zero:
lim
k→∞
Π1(φ
k
0 , φ
k
1 , σk) = 0.
It follows that the limit price of Firm 0, limk→∞ φ
k
0, is the pure deterrence
price 2
¯
αµ − 1. To see this consider the case where φ0((2
¯
αµ − 1 + η, 1)) > 0
for some η > 0. In this case Firm 1 play τ ′1 =
η
2 in Γ(µ) and guarantee
a positive profit against φ0. Since in this case the consumers for which
pµ(s) ∈ [
¯
αµ,
¯
αµ +
δ
4 ) will strictly prefer to buy from Firm 1. Thus, at the
constant price of τ ′1 =
η
2 Firm 1 can guarantee a positive expected payoff
that is bounded away from zero, for all sufficiently large k.
Consider the game Γ(µk) and the strategy profile (φ
k
0 , φ
k
1) = (2¯
αµk −
1, φk1). A standard continuity consideration implies that since φ
k = (φk0 , φ
k
1)
is a SPE of Γ(µk) and limk→∞(φ
k
0 , φ
k
1 , µk) = (φ0, φ1, µ), it holds that (φ0, φ1)
is a SPE of Γ(µ). Therefore (φ0, φ1) = (2
¯
αµ−1, φ1). Under the price 2
¯
αµ−1,
the consumer buys from Firm 0 with probability one.
This yields that (φ0, φ1) is a deterrence equilibrium of Γ(µ), which stands
in contradiction to Proposition 1.
We get the following corollary of Lemma 5.
Corollary 1. If signals exhibit vanishing likelihood or if signals are un-
bounded, then for every ε > 0 there exists some r >
¯
α and δ′ > 0 such that
if µ ∈ [ε, 1 − ε] and φ = (φ0, φ1) is a SPE of Γ(µ), then
Pµ,φ(vµ(τ0, τ1) ≥ r) > δ
′.
A similar condition holds for Firm 1.
Bounded signals without vanishing likelihood
The following lemma shows that the consumer’s threshold signal approaches
the lower bound
¯
α as µ approaches 1 in every SPE.
Lemma 6. Let {µk}
∞
k=1 ⊆ (0, 1) be a sequence of priors such that limk→∞ µk =
1. Let φk = (φk0 , φ
k
1 , σk) be a SPE for the game Γ(µk). Then the following
holds for every ǫ > 0 :
limk→∞Pµk ,φk(vµk (τ0, τ1) ∈ [¯
α,
¯
α + ǫ]) = 1.
19The convergence of φkω is assumed with respect to the weak topology.
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Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists some ǫ0 > 0 and
δ > 0 for which the following holds (possibly considering a subsequence):
limk→∞Pµk ,φk(vµk (τ0, τ1) ∈ [¯
α,
¯
α + ǫ]) < 1− δ.
This implies that the payoff to Firm 0 is at most 1 − δG0(
¯
α + ǫ0) < 1. To
see this note that with a probability of at least δ > 0 it holds for sufficiently
large k that vµk(τ0, τ1) > ¯
α + ǫ. Therefore, with probability at least δ the
profit of Firm 0 is bounded by 1−G0(
¯
α+ǫ0). Therefore, the expected profit
of Firm 0 is bounded by
δ(1 −G0(
¯
α+ ǫ0)) + (1− δ) = 1− δG0(
¯
α+ ǫ0).
Since signals are bounded and limk→∞ µk = 1 it must hold, for suffi-
ciently large k, that
2
¯
αµk − 1 > 1− δG0(¯
α+ ǫ).
In the game Γ(µk), consider a deviation by Firm 0 to the pure price τ0 =
2
¯
αµk − 1. Firm 0 then guarantees an expected revenue of
2
¯
αµk − 1 > 1− δG0(¯
α+ ǫ),
which implies a contradiction.
The following corollary shows that as µ approaches 1, it holds that for
any SPE of Γ(µ), the equilibrium price of Firm 0 approaches 1.
Corollary 4. Let {µk}
∞
k=0 ⊂ (0, 1) be a sequence of priors that converges
to 1, and let (φk0 , φ
k
1 , σk) be a SPE of Γ(µk) for any k. Then,
lim
k→∞
φk0 = 1.
Corollary 4 follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3.
The following lemma provides an upper limit to the support of Firm 1
in a non-deterrence equilibrium.
Lemma 7. If (φ0, φ1) is a non-deterrence equilibrium, then φ0([2
¯
αµ −
1, α¯µ]) = 1 and φ1([1 − 2α¯µ, 1−
¯
αµ]) = 1.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 that Π0(φ0, φ1) > 0. Note further that
for any price τ0 > α¯µ the consumer would be strictly better off choosing
e than buying from Firm 0. Therefore, we must have φ0((α¯µ, 1]) = 0 for
otherwise a profitable deviation could have been constructed for Firm 0.
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Finally, we present a proof of the third part of Theorem 2, which con-
siders the case of non-vanishing likelihood. In such a case, whenever the
prior is sufficiently biased in favor of one firm, there is a unique equilibrium
in which the a priori unfavorable firm is deterred.
Proposition 3. If g0(
¯
α) > 0, then ∃µ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that any SPE of Γ(µ)
is a deterrence equilibrium for all µ > µ¯. Symmetrically, if g1(α¯) > 0, then
∃
¯
µ ∈ (0, 1) such that any SPE of Γ(µ) is a deterrence equilibrium for all
µ <
¯
µ.
Proof. We prove the first part of the proposition. The proof of the second
part follows from symmetric considerations.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a sequence of priors
{µk} such that limk→∞ µk = 1 and a corresponding sequence of SPEs,
{(φk0 , φ
k
1)}
∞
k=1, such that φ
k = (φk0 , φ
k
1) is a non-deterrence equilibrium of
Γ(µk) for all values of k.
Note that it must be the case that for almost every realized price τ0
(with respect to φk0) of Firm 0
Π0(τ0, φ
k
1) = Π0(φ
k
0 , φ
k
1)
(otherwise Firm 0 would have a profitable deviation).
Let τk0 be the highest price in the support of φ
k
0 . It follows from the
above that
Π0(τ
k
0 , φ
k
1) = Π0(φ
k
0 , φ
k
1). (17)
Since (φk0 , φ
k
1) is a non-deterrence equilibrium, Lemma 3 implies that φ0((2¯
αµk−
1, 1]) > 0 for all k ≥ 1.
We next show that for all sufficiently large k there exists ε > 0 such that
Π0(τ
k
0 − ε, φ
k
1)−Π0(τ
k
0 , φ
k
1) > 0.
We claim first that vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1) > ¯
α for almost every realized τ1 (with
respect to φk1). Assume that there exists a measurable subset T ⊂ [0, 1]
with φk1(T ) > 0 such that vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1) = ¯
α for all τk0 . Since vµk(τ0, τ1) is
increasing in τ0 for every fixed τ1, it follows from the definition of τ
k
0 that
vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1) = ¯
α for φk0 almost all realized prices τ
k
0 of Firm 0. Therefore,
we must have that the profit to Firm 1, conditional on τ1 ∈ T, is zero. By
Lemma 3, Firm 1’s expected payoff under φk is strictly positive, and hence
we must have a profitable deviation for Firm 1.
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Using equation (9) we can write
∂Π0(τ0, φ
k
1)
∂τ0
|τ0=τk0
=
∫ (
µk(1−G0(vµk(τ0, τ1) + (1− µk)(1−G1(vµk(τ0, τ1))
)
dφk1(τ1)
− τk0
(
∂vµk(τ0, τ1)
∂τ0
|τk0
)(
µkg0(vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1)) + (1− µ)g1(vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1))
)
dφk1(τ1).
(18)
Since limk→∞ µk = 1, it follows from Lemma 6 that
lim
k→∞
Pµk ,φk1
(vµk(τk, τ
k
1 )− ¯
α > δ) = 0,
for any δ > 0.
Since the signal structure (F0, F1, S) does not exhibit the vanishing like-
lihood property, it follows that g1(
¯
α) > 0 and, by Lemma 4, that g0(
¯
α) > 0.
Therefore, for some β > 0,
lim
k→∞
Pµk,φk1
(µkg0(vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1)) + (1− µk)g1(vµk(τ
k
0 , τ1)) > β) = 1.
We further note that φk1([0, 1 − ¯
αµk ]) = 1 by Lemma 7.
Since limk→∞ µk = 1 we have that limk→∞ φ
k
1 = 0. Moreover, Corollary
4 implies that limk→∞ τ
k
0 = limk→∞ φ
k
0 = 1. Therefore, limk→∞(τ
k
0 −τ
k
1 )
2 =
1. Hence equation (11) and equation (12) of Lemma 1 imply that
lim
k→∞
(
∂vµk(τ0, τ
k
1 )
∂τ0
|τk0
)
=∞, (19)
for any choice of τk1 in the support of φ
k
1 . Therefore, equation (18) implies
that ∂Π0(τ0,τ1)
∂τ0
|τ0=τk0
< 0 for all sufficiently large values of k. Hence, in
particular, for all sufficiently large values of k there exists a sufficiently
small ε > 0 such that
Π0(τ
k
0 − ε, φ
k
1)−Π0(τ
k
0 , φ
k
1) > 0.
Therefore equation (17) implies that for all sufficiently large k, Firm 0 has a
profitable deviation from φk0 . This stands in contradiction to the assumption
that (φk0 , φ
k
1) is an equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 2 consolidates Corollary 3, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3.
C Proofs for the Farsighted Firms
We state some lemmata that will prove useful for obtaining the results for
farsighted firms.
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Lemma 8. 2
¯
αµ−1 is a strictly convex function of µ with a bounded deriva-
tive on [0, 1].
Proof. Let
h(µ) = 2
¯
αµ − 1 = 2
µ
¯
α
µ
¯
α+ (1− µ)(1−
¯
α)
− 1. (20)
The first derivative of h(µ) is h′(µ) =
2
¯
α(1−
¯
α)
[µ(2
¯
α−1)+(1−µ)]2 , which is bounded by
2(1−
¯
α)
¯
α
. This establishes the first claim of the lemma.
The second derivative of h(µ) is
d2h(µ)
dµ2
=
4(1 −
¯
α)
¯
α(2
¯
α − 1)
(µ(1− 2
¯
α) − (1−
¯
α))3
. (21)
Recall that
¯
α < 0.5 and so the enumerator in equation (21) is negative. In
addition, as µ ≤ 1 we conclude that 1−
¯
α > 1− 2
¯
α ≥ µ(1− 2
¯
α) and so the
denominator of (21) is also negative. Thus, d
2h(µ)
dµ2
> 0 and so h(µ) must be
strictly convex.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Assume by way contradiction that signals exhibit vanishing likelihood and
asymptotic learning fails in some equilibrium (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯). This entails that
for some constant 0 < η < 12 one of the two following events, µ∞ ∈ [
1
2 , 1−η]
or µ∞ ∈ [η,
1
2 ], has positive probability. Let us assume, without loss of
generality, that it is the former event. Let r > 0 denote its probability.
More formally, if H ′ ⊆ H∞ is the set of all infinite histories for which
limt→∞ µt = µ∞ ∈ [
1
2 , 1 − η] then P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯)(H
′) = r > 0. Further note
that for P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯)-almost every infinite history h ∈ H
′ it must hold that
limt→∞Π
δ
1(φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht) = 0 (ht ∈ Ht is the truncation of h).
Using similar arguments to those invoked in the proof of Proposition 1 we
conclude that for almost every history h ∈ H ′ it holds that limt→∞ |Π
δ
0(φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht)−
2
¯
αµt − 1| = 0.
For every ǫ > 0 let us denote by Hǫ ⊆ H the set of all finite histories for
which
|Πδ0(φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯|ht)− 2¯
αµt − 1| ≤ ǫ.
It follows from the above that for every ǫ > 0,
P(φ¯0,φ¯1,σ¯)(∃t s.t. ht ∈ Hǫ and µt ≤ 1−
η
2
) ≥ r.
As we assume vanishing likelihood, we can invoke Proposition 2 and
conclude that there exists sufficiently small ǫ0 > 0 such that whenever
µ ≤ 1 − η2 , Firm 0 has some price τ0 ∈ [0, 1] that guarantees the following
stage payoff:
Π0(τ0, φ1, µ) > 2
¯
αµ − 1 + ǫ0, (22)
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for every strategy φ1 ∈ ∆([0, 1]) of Firm 1.
We define the strategy φˆ0 for Firm 0 as follows. Let h be some finite
history. If h ∈ H ǫ0
2
then set φˆ0(ht) = τ0, where τ0 is the price that satisfies
the inequality in equation (22). If h 6∈ H ǫ0
2
but has some prefix ht ∈ H ǫ0
2
then set the price at 2
¯
αµt+1−1 (where µt+1 is the public belief at stage t+1).
Note that this implies that from stage t+ 1 onward Firm 1 is deterred and
the public belief remains fixed. Finally, whenever no prefix of h is in H ǫ0
2
let the price be that which was chosen according to the original strategy φ¯0.
The continuation payoff of Firm 0 for any finite history in H ǫ0
2
is
(1− δ)[2
¯
αµt − 1 + ǫ0] + δE(φˆ0,φ¯1,σ¯)[2¯
αµt+1 − 1|ht].
That is, the current period deviation of Firm 0 yields, by equation (22),
an expected payoff of at least 2
¯
αµt − 1 + ǫ0. Thereafter the value of µt+1
is realized and in all subsequent periods t′ > t Firm 0 receives a constant
payoff of 2
¯
αµt+1 − 1. As the function 2¯
αµ − 1 is convex (by Lemma 8) this
continuation payoff is guaranteed to satisfy the following inequality:
E(φˆ0,φ¯1),σ¯[2¯
αµt+1 − 1|ht] ≥ 2¯
αµt − 1.
Comparing this with the continuation payoff from the original strategy im-
plies that the deviation yields a profit that is at least (1− δ) ǫ02 . This stands
in contradiction to the fact that (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.
Assume that the signal structure does not satisfy the vanishing likelihood
property and so either g0(
¯
α) > 0 or g0(α¯) > 0. Let us assume without loss
of generality that g0(
¯
α) > 0. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For every discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists µ′ > 0 such
that if µ0 ≥ µ
′, then the following strategy is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategy of the repeated game with initial prior µ0 and discount factor δ: at
every history ht Firm 0 asks a price of 2
¯
αµt − 1 and Firm 1 asks a price 0.
Proof. Firm 0 sets a price of 2
¯
αµt − 1 that necessarily drives Firm 1 out of
the market. Therefore, no matter what price Firm 1 offers it cannot make
a positive profit and so no profitable deviation exists for it. To establish
the claim we need to show that if µ0 is sufficiently large, then Firm 0 also
doesn’t have a profitable deviation.
To see this, we show next that for a large enough initial prior µ (we
omit the subscript 0 that refers to the initial stage), Firm 0 does not have a
one-shot profitable deviation given this strategy profile. In fact, it is enough
to establish this for the first stage.
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Whenever Firm 0 increases its price to τ, and the price profile becomes
τ = (τ, 0) (clearly decreasing the price is not profitable), there are two
possibilities that can happen in the first stage: either the consumer buys
from Firm 0, in which case we denote new public belief µ0(µ, τ), or the
consumer buys from Firm 1, in which case we denote new public belief
µ1(µ, τ). With this new notation we formulate the continuation payoff from
a one-shot deviation at the first stage, as a function of the new price τ :
(1− δ)(1 −Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))τ+
δ[(1 −Gµ(vµ(τ, 0)))(2
¯
αµ0 (µ,τ) − 1) +Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))(2¯
αµ1(µ,τ) − 1)].
We need to show that for all sufficiently large µ this continuation payoff
is at most the payoff prior to a deviation, 2
¯
αµ−1, for every τ . Equivalently,
we need to show that
(1− δ)[2
¯
αµ − 1− (1−Gµ(vµ(τ, 0)))τ ] ≥ (23)
δ[(1 −Gµ(vµ(τ, 0)))(2
¯
αµ0 (µ,τ) − 2¯
αµ) +Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))(2
¯
αµ1(µ,τ) − 2¯
αµ)]
Using Bayes, rule we infer the following three equalities:
1−Gµ(vµ(τ, 0)) = µ
(
1−G0
(
vµ(τ, 0)
))
+ (1− µ)
(
1−G1
(
vµ(τ, 0)
))
,
µ0(µ, τ) =
µ(1−G0(vµ(τ, 0)))
1−Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))
,
and
µ1(µ, τ) =
µG0(vµ(τ, 0))
Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))
.
A simple calculation yields
µ0(µ, τ)− µ =
µ(1− µ)(G1(vµ(τ, 0)) −G0(vµ(τ, 0)))
1−Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))
, (24)
µ− µ1(µ, τ) =
µ(1− µ)(G1(vµ(τ, 0)) −G0(vµ(τ, 0)))
Gµ(vµ(τ, 0))
. (25)
In addition, since the function
¯
αµ is convex in µ with a bounded deriva-
tive (by Lemma 8), it is also a Lipschitz function of µ. Therefore, there
exists a constant C such that
0 < 2
¯
αµ0(µ,τ) − 2¯
αµ ≤ C(µ0(µ, τ)− µ), (26)
0 < 2
¯
αµ − 2
¯
αµ1(µ,τ) ≤ C(µ− µ1(µ, τ)). (27)
Instead of proving inequality (23), by equations (24), (25), (26), and
(27) it is sufficient to prove that for all sufficiently large µ it holds for every
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τ ∈ [0, 1] that
(1− δ)[2
¯
αµ − 1 + (1−Gµ(vµ(τ, 0)))τ ] ≥ (28)
[G1(vµ(τ, 0)) −G0(vµ(τ, 0))]δµ(1 − µ)C.
Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case. Then there exists
a sequence of priors {µk}
∞
k=1 ⊂ (0, 1) with a limit 1 and an appropriate
sequence {τk}
∞
k=1 of prices such that
(1− δ)[2
¯
αµk − 1− (1−Gµk(vµk(τk, 0)))τk] < (29)
[G1(vµk (τk, 0)) −G0(vµk(τk, 0))]δµk(1− µk)C.
Since vµk(τk, 0) > ¯
α (for otherwise we have an equality in (29)) we can
rewrite (29) as follows:
2
¯
αµk − 1− (1−Gµk (vµk(τk, 0)))τk
G1(vµk(τk, 0))−G0(vµk(τk, 0))
<
δ
1− δ
µk(1− µk)C. (30)
We rearrange (30) and get
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
G1(vµk(τk, 0))−G0(vµk(τk, 0))
+
G1(vµk(τk, 0))τk
G1(vµk(τk))−G0(vµk(τk))
<
δ
1− δ
µk(1− µk)C.
(31)
Clearly, since limk→∞ µk = 1, the limit of the right-hand side of (31) is zero
and therefore in order to establish contradiction we show that
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
G1(vµk(τk, 0)) −G0(vµk (τk, 0))
+
G1(vµk(τk, 0))τk
G1(vµk(τk))−G0(vµk (τk))
(32)
is bounded away from zero as k goes to infinity.
We claim first that lim infk→∞
G1(vµk (τk))τk
G1(vµk (τk))−G0(vµk (τk))
≥ 1. To do so we
recall equation (29). Note that as k goes to infinity, 1 − µk goes to 0 and
so the right-hand side of (29) goes to 0. In addition, limk→∞ 2
¯
αµk − 1 = 1
and so equation (29) implies that limk→∞(1 − Gµk(vµk(τk, 0)))τk ≥ 1. As
both multipliers are in the unit interval this necessarily implies that both
approach 1. Therefore, limk→∞ τk = 1 and limk→∞Gµk(vµk(τk, 0)) = 0.
The latter then implies that
lim
k→∞
vµk(τk, 0) = ¯
α. (33)
We note that since vµk(τk, 0) > ¯
α, Lemma 10 implies that 1 > G1(vµk (τk))−
G0(vµk(τk)) > 0. Therefore G1(vµk(τk))τkG1(vµk(τk))−G0(vµk (τk)) ≥ 1.
Furthermore, since limk→∞ τk = 1 it holds that
lim inf
k→∞
G1(vµk (τk))τk
G1(vµk(τk))−G0(vµk(τk))
≥ 1. (34)
39
Therefore in order to show that the term in equation (32) is bounded
away from zero and hence leads to a contradiction, it is sufficient to show
that
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
G1(vµk(τk, 0)) −G0(vµk(τk, 0))
(35)
has a limit 0 as k goes to infinity, which establishes a contradiction.
By a standard first-order approximation it follows that for every ǫ > 0
there exists xǫ >
¯
α such that for every x ≤ xǫ,
(x−
¯
α)[gi(
¯
α)− ǫ] ≤ Gi(x) ≤ (x−
¯
α)[gi(
¯
α) + ǫ].
Since τk > 2
¯
αµk − 1, the numerator in (35) is negative. By Lemma 10 the
denominator is positive. We use the approximation to get
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
G1(v(τk, 0)) −G0(v(τk, 0))
>
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
(g1(
¯
α)− g0(
¯
α) + 2ε)(vµk (τk, 0) − ¯
α)
. (36)
Now recall that vµk(τk, 0)−¯
α = vµk(τk, 0)−vµk (2¯
αµk−1, 0) = v
′
µk
(τ˜k, 0)(τk−
2
¯
αµ + 1) for some τ˜k ∈ (2
¯
αµ − 1, τk). Therefore,
2
¯
αµk − 1− τk
G1(vµk(τk, 0)) −G0(vµk(τk, 0))
>
−1
(g1(
¯
α) − g0(
¯
α) + 2ε)v′µk (τ˜k, 0)
. (37)
Since τ˜k ∈ (2
¯
αµ − 1, τk) we have that limk→∞ τ˜k = 1. Since Firm 1 offers
its product at price zero, the market is full. Therefore, Lemma 1 implies
that limk→∞ v
′
µ(τ˜k, 0) = ∞. As a result, (35) approaches zero as k goes to
infinity. This establishes a contradiction and concludes the proof of Lemma
9.
We now conclude the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 9 there
exists a µ′ < 1 such that the strategy where at every history ht Firm 0
asks a price of 2
¯
αµt − 1 and Firm 1 asks a price of 0 is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game with an initial prior µ0 ≥ µ
′. Consider an arbitrary
prior µ0. We define a game where whenever µt ≥ µ
′ Firm 0 and Firm 1 are
constrained to play actions 2
¯
αµt−1 and 0 respectively with probability one.
It is easy to see that this game possesses a Bayesian equilibrium (τ¯0, τ¯1, σ¯).
By Lemma 9 this equilibrium is also a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
unconstrained game. Clearly, under (φ¯0, φ¯1, σ¯) asymptotic learning must
fail. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.
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D Auxilliary Lemmas
Lemma 10. The ratio G1(r)
G0(r)
is non-increasing in r and G1(r)
G0(r)
> 1 for all
r ∈ (
¯
α, α¯). In particular, G0 first-order stochastically dominates G1.
Proof. The proof follows from the more general result that appears in
Lemma A1 of [2].
Corollary 2. Let (σ, τ0, τ1) be a myopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If
asymptotic learning holds, then conditional on state ω ∈ Ω,
lim
t→∞
P(σ,τ0,τ1)({σt(µt, s, τ(µt)) = ω}|ω) = 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that the realized state is ω = 0.
Since asymptotic learning holds, we have that limt µt = 1 almost surely. By
Corollary 6 we have that limt→∞ vµt(τ
t
0(µt), τ
t
1(µt)) = ¯
α. Therefore,
lim
t→∞
P(σ,τ0,τ1)({σt(µt, s, τ(µt)) = 0}|ω = 0) = limt→∞
G0(vµt(τ
t
0(µt), τ
t
1(µt))) =
G0(
¯
α) = 1.
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